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NOTE
POLICEMAN, CITIZEN, OR BOTH? A CIVILIAN
ANALOGUE EXCEPTION TO GARCETTI V CEBALLOS
Caroline A. Flynn*
The First Amendment prohibits the government from leveraging its em-
ployment relationship with a public employee in order to silence the
employee's speech. But the Supreme Court dramatically curtailed this
right in Garcetti v. Ceballos by installing a categorical bar. if the public
employee spoke "pursuant to her official duties," her First Amendment re-
taliation claim cannot proceed. Garcetti requires the employee to show
that she was speaking entirely "as a citizen" and not at all "as an employ-
ee." But this is a false dichotomy-especially because the value of the
employee's speech to the public is no less if she is speaking pursuant to
mixed motivations.
A recent Second Circuit case, Jackler v. Byrne, suggests an exception to
Garcetti's categorical bar Because the public employee's speech in Jackler
had a civilian analogue-that is, because an ordinary citizen could speak
in the same manner and to the same audience-the court allowed the em-
ployee's claim to proceed. The Second Circuit's exception contradicts
Garcetti, but it furthers significant First Amendment values while ade-
quately protecting public employers' interest in controlling employee
speech. As such, the Supreme Court should adopt the civilian analogue ex-
ception to ameliorate Garcetti's problematic rule.
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INTRODUCTION
Speech law has evolved considerably from Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes's declaration that "[a policeman] may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."1 Today,
the law prohibits the government from basing a policeman's employment on
a condition that violates his First Amendment right to freedom of expres-
sion.' This doctrine recognizes that the threat of dismissal from public
employment is "a potent means of inhibiting speech ' 3 and that the signifi-
cant public interest in free and open debate on matters of public concern
requires giving public employees the same meaningful speech protection
that other citizens enjoy.4 Thus, in a series of landmark decisions beginning
in the 1960s, the Supreme Court crafted a First Amendment doctrine that
protects public employees from employer retaliation in response to the em-
ployees' speech.'
This protection follows from basic First Amendment values. First, a
government employee has the same interest in commenting on public mat-
ters that a nongovernment employee has.6 Second, there is "value to the
public [in] receiving the opinions and information that a public employee
may disclose."7 At the same time, the Court's decisions acknowledged that
the First Amendment should not insulate a public employee's disruptive
speech at a significant cost to her government employer, even if that speech
related to a public matter.8 The resulting doctrine, known as the Pickering-
Connick framework, involves a threshold inquiry and a balancing test: a
public employee's speech is protected only if (1) the employee was speaking
1. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
2. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
3. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
4. Id. at 573; see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) ("The First
Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to
restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private
citizens.").
5. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1987); Connick, 461 U.S. at 154;
Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979); Pickering, 391 U.S. at
574; Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
6. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 428-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 429.
8. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-52 (balancing employees' interest in speaking on a mat-
ter of public concern against the government's interest in the "effective and efficient
fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public").
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on a matter of public concern9 and (2) the employee's interest in speaking
outweighs the employer's interest in controlling her speech. '0
In 2006, the Supreme Court added a third requirement to the doctrinal
framework-a requirement that drastically curtails the speech rights of gov-
ernment employees. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court categorically denied
First Amendment protection to any public employees who speak "pursuant
to their official duties."'" For a public employee to have any chance of sus-
taining a First Amendment retaliation claim post-Garcetti, the employee
must have spoken entirely "as a citizen" and not at all "as an employee.""2
Under this test, when a public employee's speech concerns the subject mat-
ter of her employment, the government employer's interest in controlling its
operations and message is assumed to always outweigh the employee's in-
terests and the interests of the public. 3
The line the Garcetti Court drew between the employee's dual roles as
citizen and public servant lacks adequate justification. 14 As Justice Stevens
wrote in dissent, "The notion that there is a categorical difference between
speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one's employment is
quite wrong."' 5 If protection of a particular employee's speech is supported
by First Amendment policy-that is, if the employee is speaking as a citizen
on a matter of public concern-there is no compelling rationale for why the
claim should not proceed to the balancing stage regardless of whether the
speech's subject matter "fall[s] within a job description.' '1 6 Due to the major-
ity's failure to appreciate the dual roles public employees occupy
simultaneously, Garcetti significantly reduced the scope of protection for
those employees; it replaced the balancing framework with a bright-line rule
designed to automatically privilege the interests of the government employer
at the expense of the speaker and the public. To quote Justice Stevens once
again, "The proper answer to the question 'whether the First Amendment
protects a government employee from discipline based on speech made pur-
suant to the employee's official duties' is 'Sometimes,' not 'Never.' "'1
9. Id. at 146-47. For a description of what constitutes "a matter of public concern,"
see infra text accompanying note 34.
10. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
11. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
12. Id.
13. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422-23. For further discussion about what exactly it means for
an individual to be speaking "pursuant to his official duties," "as an employee," or about "the
subject matter of his employment," see infra Section I.C.
14. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("But why do the majority's
concerns, which we all share, require categorical exclusion of First Amendment protection
against any official retaliation for things said on the job? Is it not possible to respect the un-
challenged individual and public interests in the speech ... without drawing the strange line
15. Id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 426 (citation omitted).
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A recent Second Circuit case, Jackler v. Byrne,18 takes an important step
toward remedying the dual-role problem in Garcetti's "pursuant to official
duties" test. Relying on language in the Garcetti opinion stating that speech
pursuant to an employee's official duties has "no relevant analogue to
speech by citizens who are not government employees," 19 the Second Cir-
cuit crafted an exception to Garcetti's categorical rule: if the employee's
speech does have a relevant civilian analogue-that is, if a citizen could
speak in a way that is substantially similar in motivation, in the same forum,
and to the same audience-20 -then it may be protected regardless of whether
the employee is concurrently speaking pursuant to his professional obliga-
tions.21 The Second Circuit applied this exception to protect a police officer
who refused to alter his witness statement in an official department report
concerning another officer's use of force. Finding that the officer's acted as a
private citizen when he chose not to lie in an investigation, the court allowed
his claim to proceed--despite the fact that he was speaking in part as a po-
lice officer.
22
It must be acknowledged that the Second Circuit's exception does not
follow from a strict interpretation of Garcetti. The Garcetti Court was clear
in stating that, when employees speak pursuant to their official duties, no
possibility of First Amendment protection exists.2 3 Not surprisingly, the
Jackler decision was severely criticized by the D.C. Circuit a month after-
ward; the D.C. Circuit accused its sister circuit of having "g[otten] Garcetti
backwards. '24 But while Jackler may be unsound under current doctrine, it
is sound as a matter of First Amendment policy.
The Supreme Court appears uninterested in overturning Garcetti in the
near future. Even the four Garcetti dissenters agreed that the Pickering-
Connick framework needed refinement to exclude a greater number of
public employee retaliation claims (though they disagreed about how).
25
Given this state of affairs, Garcetti's detractors must refine the decision at
the margins. The Second Circuit's civilian analogue exception to the harsh
"pursuant to official duties" rule could prove to be the compromise that fills
18. 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012).
19. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 (majority opinion).
20. See infra Section III.B.
21. See Jackler, 658 E3d at 241-42.
22. Id.
23. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amend-
ment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer
discipline.").
24. Bowie v. Maddox, 653 E3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir.), denying reh'g to 642 F.3d 1122
(D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012).
25. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recommending a "feasible"
"adjustment using the basic Pickering balancing scheme"); id. at 449-50 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (suggesting a test in which the plaintiff could proceed to the Pickering balancing stage if
he demonstrates "augmented need for constitutional protection and diminished risk of undue
judicial interference with governmental management of the public's affairs").
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in Garcetti's theoretical gaps and brings the doctrine back in line with First
Amendment principles.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should adopt the Second Cir-
cuit's civilian analogue exception to Garcetti's "pursuant to official duties"
rule. Part I surveys the relevant pre-Garcetti First Amendment doctrine and
argues that by issuing a categorical bar, Garcetti overly limited the instances
in which a public employee can seek First Amendment protection. Part I
explains how the Second Circuit developed the civilian analogue exception
that it ultimately applied in Jackler and acknowledges that this exception
does not faithfully adhere to Garcetti. Part III argues that although the civil-
ian analogue exception does not follow from Garcetti, it properly identifies
the value of public employee speech to society and recognizes the dual roles
that public employees can occupy. The Supreme Court should embrace the
exception as a beneficial reworking of Garcetti's problematic rule.
I. THE SPEECH RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
AND GARCETTI V CEBALLOS
This Part discusses Garcetti v. Ceballos and argues that its rule marks a
problematic shift from precedent. Section L.A details the development of
public employee speech protection through Pickering v. Board of Education,
Connick v. Myers, and Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District.
Section I.B discusses Garcetti itself and examines the holding's "theoretical
underpinnings."26 Section I.C argues that Garcetti's categorical bar is unjus-
tified as a matter of First Amendment policy.
A. The Problem of First Amendment Protection for Public Employee Speech
Meaningful protection for public employee speech began in Pickering v.
Board of Education, in which a public school teacher brought a retaliation
claim against the school board after it fired him for writing a political letter
to a local newspaper. 7 In Pickering, the Court pointed to "[t]he public inter-
est in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance"
as the "core value" of the Free Speech Clause. 8 The Court found the con-
tent of the teacher's letter-whether the school system required additional
funds and how those funds should be distributed-to be "matter[s] of legit-
imate public concern" on which the public would benefit from the teacher's
opinion.2 9 The Court recognized that society could not realize this benefit if
the threat of retaliation prevented public employees from exercising their
26. Id. at 423 (majority opinion).
27. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The letter criticized the board for its handling of a funding
ballot proposal and its allocation of financial resources between the school's educational and
athletic programs. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
28. Id. at 573; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("[The First
Amendment] was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people.").
29. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.
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speech rights. 30 Accordingly, it held that the right of public employees to
speak on a matter of public concern was protected up to the point at which
the employer's interest in controlling the speech outweighed the employee's
interest in speaking. This test required courts "to arrive at a balance between
the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."'"
In Connick v. Myers, the Court refined the Pickering balancing test to
categorically exclude claims based on employee speech not involving a mat-
ter of public concern. 32 In Connick, the public employee was an assistant
district attorney who, upon learning that she was to be transferred, distribut-
ed a questionnaire to her coworkers asking their opinions on office policies,
their confidence in their supervisors, and whether they felt pressured to
work on political campaigns.33 Instead of proceeding directly to the Picker-
ing balancing test, the Court decided that "if [the plaintiff's] questionnaire
cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public
concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her dis-
charge."34 Concluding that the majority of the questions "[could not] be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other con-
cern to the community," the Court only allowed the assistant district
attorney's claim regarding the question about forced campaigning to pro-
ceed to the balancing stage. Ultimately, the Court did not find that her
interest in asking that question outweighed her employer's interest in man-
aging its office.
3 6
Connick's "matter of public concern" screening device reflected the
Court's worry about "attempt[s] to constitutionalize the employee griev-
ance" at the extreme end of the spectrum of public employee cases.3 7 But
the Court also acknowledged the government employer's need for wide dis-
cretion in managing its operations and personnel for the public's ultimate
benefit. 38 Recognizing that the government has a responsibility to ensure the
efficient provision of its services,39 the Court limited the instances in which
the First Amendment protects public employee speech. Nonetheless, be-
cause employee speech on matters of public concern provides significant
value to the public as well as the speaker, the Court held that it was neces-
30. Id. at 572, 574.
31. Id. at 568.
32. 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
33. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41.
34. Id. at 146.
35. Id. at 146-49.
36. Id. at 150-54.
37. Id. at 154; see also id. at 146 (noting that although some instances of a government
employer's dismissal of an employee may seem arbitrary or unfair, ordinary civilians must
face such outcomes without any chance of judicial intervention).
38. Id. at 146.
39. Id. at 150.
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sary to balance the employee's interests against her employer's after this
threshold requirement had been met.4"
The Court also demonstrated its unwillingness to automatically bar First
Amendment claims based on the setting in which the employee spoke. In
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, the Court established
that public employee speech need not necessarily be made publicly-that is,
outside of the office-in order to merit First Amendment protection.4" The
teacher in Givhan complained privately to the school principal about racially
discriminatory policies in staff hiring.42 Despite the fact that the employee
voiced her opinions privately to a supervisor, rather than using outside
channels to speak to the public at large, her speech qualified for constitu-
tional protection.43 The Court held that the First Amendment was not
concerned with a distinction between public and private speech; it noted that
the fact that its prior decisions had only involved public expressions was not
controlling.44 Givhan thus indicated the Court's opposition to a categorical
rule excluding claims based on the context in which the employee spoke.
45
There are important takeaways from the cases leading up to Garcetti.
First, the Court consistently emphasized the importance of public employee
speech to the public itself and crafted a doctrine that would preserve this
"core value" of the First Amendment.46 Second, while these cases provided
an increasingly robust articulation of the government employer's interests in
controlling employee speech, 47 the Court did not see fit to categorically priv-
ilege this interest or determine its weight ex ante. Instead, the Court
analyzed the policies at play in each case in order to ensure that the
40. Pursuant to the facts in Connick, the Court found that the issue of whether employ-
ees felt pressured to work on political campaigns constituted a matter of public concern. Id. at
149-54 ("The limited First Amendment interest here does not require that [the government
supervisor] tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine
his authority, and destroy close working relationships.").
41. 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979).
42. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412-13.
43. Id. at 415-16.
44. The Court stated as follows:
The First Amendment forbids abridgment of the "freedom of speech." Neither the
Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this freedom is lost to the public em-
ployee who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread
his views before the public. We decline to adopt such a view of the First Amendment.
Id.
45. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 430 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Givhan stands for the proposition that an employee's speech may be protected even if she
does not speak publicly); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall
Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1178 (2007)
(noting that the Givhan Court adhered to "ad hoc balancing considerations"); cf Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149-54 (1983) (proceeding to the Pickering balancing test for one por-
tion of the plaintiff's speech, despite the fact that the relevant expression took place entirely
within the office).
46. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).
47. See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 150.
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substantive goals of the First Amendment were achieved. 48 Garcetti v. Ce-
ballos, however, marked a radical departure from both of these approaches.
B. Garcetti v. Ceballos
In 2006, the Supreme Court held in Garcetti that "when public employ-
ees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline." '49 The
Garcetti decision amounted to a screening device barring all First Amend-
ment claims brought by a public employee acting pursuant to her official
duties."
The plaintiff in Garcetti was a deputy district attorney tasked with pre-
paring memoranda for his supervisors advising them on how prosecutions
should proceed. The memo at issue regarded a sheriff's affidavit that had
been used to obtain a search warrant in a particular case. 1 After conducting
his own investigation, the deputy district attorney concluded that the affida-
vit contained misrepresentations; he documented his concerns as well as his
recommendation that the case be dismissed.52 The deputy's supervisors de-
cided to proceed with the prosecution and indicated their disapproval of his
handling of the case.53 In the aftermath of these events, the deputy's supervi-
sors reassigned him, transferred him to another courthouse, and denied him
a promotion. 4 The deputy eventually brought an 18 U.S.C. § 1983 action,
alleging that his supervisors retaliated against him because of his memo in
violation of the First Amendment.
5
The Garcetti Court referenced Pickering, Connick, and Givhan with ap-
proval.56 Nonetheless, the Court found that the "controlling factor" was that
"[the employee's] expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a calen-
dar deputy."57 By treating this factor as controlling, the Court parsed the
48. See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414-16; cf Rhodes, supra note 45, at 1176-87 (emphasiz-
ing the Pickering-Connick doctrine's flexibility pre-Garcetti).
49. 547U.S.at421.
50. Rhodes, supra note 45, at 1187 ("Eschewing the prevailing balancing standard
governing such claims, the Court adopted a new categorical rule banning any constitutional
safeguards."); Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Pre-
rogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 39 (2008) (arguing that after Garcetti, First Amendment
protection for a public employee's duty-related speech is "categorically denied").





56. See id. at 417-20 ("The Court's decisions, then, have sought both to promote the
individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens on matters
of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to perform
their important public functions.").
57. Id. at421.
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Connick inquiry; it turned the question of whether an employee spoke "as a
citizen upon matters of public concern"5 8 into two separate questions, the
first of which was "Did the employee speak as a citizen?"59 The Court found
that if the answer was no-because the employee spoke pursuant to her offi-
cial duties-then the First Amendment analysis did not need to proceed to
the second question: whether the employee spoke on a matter of public con-
cern.
60
The Garcetti majority emphasized that its decision was supported by the
policy goals enunciated in the Court's precedent.6 First, the Court stated
that its holding demonstrated due "attention to the potential societal value of
employee speech,"62 as the holding only excluded an employee's "work
product" from serving as the basis for a First Amendment claim. 63 Because
an employee could presumably still participate in public debate without us-
ing her work product to do so, the Court insisted that its holding did not
diminish "the prospect of constitutional protection for [an employee's] con-
tributions to the civic discourse" to a significant extent.
64
Second, the Court stressed "the emphasis of our precedents on affording
government employers sufficient discretion to manage their operations.
65
The Court stated that its holding showed due deference to managerial dis-
cretion because "[e]mployers have heightened interests in controlling speech
made by an employee in his or her professional capacity."66 In other words,
the Court determined that it was proper to automatically add extra weight to
the employer's side of the Pickering scale whenever the employee was
speaking on behalf of his employer.67 This extra weight should be added, the
Court reasoned, because "[o]fficial communications have official conse-
quences, creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity."68
58. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
59. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at
420-22, 424), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012).
60. Garceni, 547 U.S. at 423 ("When an employee speaks as a citizen addressing a
matter of public concern, the First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing
interests surrounding the speech and its consequences. When, however, the employee is simp-
ly performing his or her job duties, there is no warrant for a similar degree of scrutiny.").
61. Id. at 422-23.
62. Id. at 422.
63. Id. The Court used the term "work product" to mean something created by an em-




66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. See Diane Norcross, Comment, Separating the Employee from the Citizen: The
Social Science Implications of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 543, 561 (2011)
("Rather than a rule providing for case-by-case balancing like in Pickering, the Court conclu-
sively held in favor of managerial discretion for all future public-employee speech cases
.... " ).
68. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422.
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Though the Court grounded this concern about managerial discretion in
precedent, it was effectively articulating a new adherence to the normative
idea that the government employer should not only have managerial control
over its office and personnel but also over its office's public message.69 The
Court's deference to the government's "managerial prerogative" was a sig-
nificant development in Connick's articulation of the employer's general
interest in controlling its operations.70 This concern is reflected in the
Court's description of the memo as "speech that owes its existence to a pub-
lic employee's professional responsibilities" and that which "the employer
itself has commissioned or created."71 Garcetti's managerial prerogative
argument posits that because the government is exercising ownership over
speech it considers its own work product, it cannot be infringing on the em-
ployee's general speech rights as a citizen.72 If the opportunity for the
speech would not have existed but for an employment duty, a citizen could
not have spoken in the same manner free from government control.
Administrative considerations also informed the Garcetti decision. The
Court stated that an unqualified obedience to the Pickering-Connick balanc-
ing framework, on the facts of Garcetti, "would be to demand permanent
judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental operations to a degree
inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and the separation of pow-
ers."73 Thus, the Court installed the "pursuant to official duties" screen
presumably to avoid excessive judicial intrusion into the political branches'
operations. By promulgating a formalist test, the Court attempted to pro-
mote predictability and uniformity in future public employee First
Amendment cases by limiting the judicial discretion inherent in the Picker-
ing-Connick framework. 74 Principles of federalism and separation of powers
obviously support a rule that limits the judiciary's constitutional license to
intervene in governmental affairs. But the Court did not explain why these
principles trumped First Amendment considerations to the extent that claims
based on official-duty speech must be denied across the board.75
69. See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of
Its Workers'Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 67-68 (2009); Rosenthal,
supra note 50, at 42-43.
70. See Rosenthal, supra note 50, at 40-43, 61-62; see also Elizabeth Dale, Employee
Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading ofGarcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKE-
LEY J. Emp. & LAB. L. 175, 214 (2008) (arguing that Garcetti "embedd[ed] the doctrine of
management rights into public employee speech cases").
71. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421-22.
72. Id. at421; see also Dale, supra note 70, at 213.
73. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423.
74. See Rhodes, supra note 45, at 1175-76 (describing the commonly perceived ad-
vantages and disadvantages of formalist rules).
75. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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C. Garcetti's Misguided Line Drawing
In Garcetti, the Court categorically barred all First Amendment claims
based on speech that arises out of a public employee's official duties; how-
ever, the Court's separation of the employee's dual roles is unjustified.76
Determining the boundaries of public employee speech protection is diffi-
cult, in part because the speakers "are occupying multiple roles, and the
different roles possess very different rights and powers."77 But instead of
adhering to a doctrine that allows courts to make a meaningful assessment
of whether a public employee had actually spoken as a citizen, the Garcetti
Court opted for an inflexible dichotomy. To the Garcetti Court, if a public
employee spoke in her role as an employee, she could not have been speak-
ing concurrently as a citizen.78 But the Court should have resisted the urge to
put the speaker in one box or the other.
First, the Court's suggestion that its categorical bar is consistent with
precedent emphasizing the "societal value of employee speech"79 rings hol-
low. Although the Court cited Pickering with approbation, its endorsement
was necessarily limited. The Garcetti holding does not allow for a full reali-
zation of the values Pickering stands for-namely, the value of the public
employee's speech to public decisionmaking.8 ° The Garcetti Court stated
that it would uphold Pickering's result because "[t]eachers are, as a class,
the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite
opinions as to how [school] funds ... should be spent. Accordingly, it is
essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions."' Thus, the
majority acknowledged that the societal value of a public employee's speech
could potentially be great if the speech related to her job.82 Yet the majority
gave no reason why speech is any less valuable if it pertains to matters at the
essence of the public employee's job-that is, if the speech furthers her offi-
cial responsibilities.83 The majority's argument instead appears to rely on an
76. E.g., id. ("But why do the majority's concerns, which we all share, require categori-
cal exclusion of First Amendment protection against any official retaliation for things said on
the job? Is it not possible to respect the unchallenged individual and public interests in the
speech through a Pickering balance without drawing the strange line... ?").
77. Kermit Roosevelt, Who's Afraid ofCeballos?, BALKINIZATION (May 31, 2006, 5:15
PM), http:/Ibalkin.blogspot.com/2006/05/whos-afraid-of-ceballos.html.
78. Norton, supra note 69, at 12 (arguing that the holding renders the categories of
employee and citizen mutually exclusive "such that an employee's official-duties speech can
never be characterized, for First Amendment purposes, as also expressing the employee's
views as a citizen").
79. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (majority opinion).
80. Jack Balkin refers to this as the "information policy goal[]" of the public employee
First Amendment doctrine. See Jack Balkin, Ceballos--The Court Creates Bad Information
Policy, BALKINIZATION (May 30, 2006, 2:41 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.con/2006/
05/ceballos-court-creates-bad-information.html.
81. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572
(1968)).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 433 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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assumption that when the speech is pursuant to employment duties, the gov-
ernment employer's interests will nearly always outweigh the value of that
speech to the employee (and, though this goes unstated, to the public as
well).84 But the majority did not demonstrate why this is necessarily true. As
a result, in most public employee First Amendment cases, the public's inter-
est in hearing what the employee has to say is rendered moot.
Some commentators argue that the Garcetti majority's assumption pro-
ceeds from its acknowledgment of the importance that should be accorded
to the government's managerial prerogative .8  But even if this is so, the
Court never explained why the prerogative must be given absolute priority at
the expense of the speaker's interest in speaking and the public's interest in
hearing it.86 Even assuming that the Court's deference is warranted and there
is value in protecting the government's ability to control those who speak on
its behalf,87 the Court failed to explain why the government should have a
right to control all speech made on its behalf by all public employees. 88
This last theoretical gap is problematic because the strict on-duty / off-
duty distinction bars any First Amendment claims brought by employees
whose official duties require them to report wrongdoing internally.8 9 Justice
Souter was especially troubled by the lack of protection for such employees.
It seemed "obvious" to him that "the individual and public value of such
speech is no less, and may well be greater, when the employee speaks pur-
suant to his duties in addressing a subject he knows intimately for the very
reason that it falls within his duties."90 In the absence of a satisfactory justi-
fication for why the employer's managerial interests should always
84. Cf Norcross, supra note 67, at 562 ("Garcetti placed the individual employee and
the government employer on opposite sides of the balancing scale in spite of the prior theory
that public-employee speech can be beneficial to all involved.").
85. See Dale, supra note 70, at 212-15. See generally Rosenthal, supra note 50.
86. Rosenthal, supra note 50, at 42-43 (arguing that managerial prerogative was "criti-
cal" to Garceni's outcome but admitting that the Court "never explained how an employer's
entitlement to control speech that it has commissioned can be reconciled with the First
Amendment's commitment to unfettered public discussion and debate"); cf Rhodes, supra
note 45, at 1192 (arguing that a categorical rule is not appropriate when it must be applied to
highly varied circumstances and suggesting that a better course would have been for the Court
to reemphasize the importance of the government's interest).
87. Helen Norton contests Garcetti's premise that all public employees speak on behalf
of their government employer such that the government "owns" their expression. See Norton,
supra note 69.
88. See id. at 68.
89. Id. at 13-14 ("Although public entities frequently hire workers specifically to moni-
tor and flag dangerous or illegal conditions, Garcetti now counterintuitively-indeed,
perversely-empowers the government to punish them for doing just that." (footnote omit-
ted)).
90. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 430-31 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court: October Term 2005, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 335, 340-41
(2006) ("[The Garcetti] opinion thus signals a ... restriction on the ability of the public to
learn of government misconduct.").
[Vol. 111:759
Policeman, Citizen, or Both?
outweigh the other policy considerations that underlie pre-Garcetti doctrine,
the point at which the Court drew its line appears arbitrary.
The Garcetti decision also failed to explain how a lower court should de-
termine whether an employee spoke pursuant to her official duties.91 The
Court did mention some factors that it did, and did not, consider relevant to
this "practical" inquiry.92 For example, the Court acknowledged Givhan's
continued precedential force by cautioning that nonpublic, intraoffice com-
munication could still qualify for First Amendment protection.93 Similarly,
the Court indicated that the determination could not be based on whether the
speech touched on a matter related to the plaintiff's employment, as "[t]he
First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker's job."94
Finally, the Court offered descriptions of what could constitute speech pur-
suant to official duty, such as "speech that owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities" or "what the employer itself has
commissioned or created."95 But this language does not create a satisfactory
standard for lower courts to apply to the facts of other cases, as the past six
years of post-Garcetti decisions have illustrated. 96 Some courts, for instance,
apply a standard that asks whether the employee's speech is required by her
job;97 others ask whether the speech aids or furthers the employee's execu-
tion of her responsibilities in some way.98 Nor does the Court's vague
91. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 (majority opinion). The issue was not in dispute in the
Garcetti case, as both parties agreed that the plaintiff was acting pursuant to his duties as a
deputy district attorney when he wrote the memo at issue. Id.
92. Id. For instance, the Court unequivocally rejected "the suggestion that employers
can restrict employees' rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions." Id.
93. Id. at 420 ("That [the Garcetti plaintiff] expressed his views inside his office, rather
than publicly, is not dispositive. Employees in some cases may receive First Amendment pro-
tection for expressions made at work.").
94. Id. at 421.
95. Id. at421-22.
96. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 70, at 196-204 (discussing both the procedural and sub-
stantive confusion lower courts have faced in implementing Garcetti); Norcross, supra note
67, at 556-58 (describing the "pursuant to official duties" standards applied by lower courts as
"inconsistent"); Tyler Wiese, Note, Seeing Through the Smoke: "Official Duties" in the Wake
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 509, 515-23 (2010) (describing the di-
vergent approaches circuits take when determining whether speech falls within an employee's
official duties and contrasting the "chain-of-command" approach to the "assigned-
responsibility" analysis). See generally Sonya Bice, Note, Tough Talk from the Supreme Court
on Free Speech: The Illusory Per Se Rule in Garcetti as Further Evidence of Connick's Un-
workable Employee/Citizen Speech Partition, 8 J.L. Soc'v 45, 45-46 (2007) ("Circuits had
often referred to the approach chosen by the Court as a per se rule, but Garcetti is a per se rule
with an Achilles' heel-a refusal to say how 'official duties' are to be defined-that gives
plaintiffs unexpected leverage to resist dismissal and summary judgment."); Thomas Keenan,
Note, Circuit Court Interpretations of Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Development of Public
Employee Speech, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841 (2011).
97. E.g., Chaklos v. Stevens, 560 F3d 705, 712 (7th Cir. 2009) (analyzing whether
plaintiffs were "expected" to perform the function in question).
98. E.g., Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 202-03 (2d Cir. 2010) (speech "in
furtherance" of official duties suffices); Williams v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689,
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articulation properly answer the question why the scope of the employee's
speech rights depends on the on-duty / off-duty distinction.
In short, Garcetti was wrongly decided. It replaced the Pickering-
Connick balancing framework with a bright-line rule designed to
automatically privilege the interests of the government employer at the ex-
pense of the speaker and the public. The decision's shortcomings stemmed,
in part, from the majority's failure to appreciate how a public employee can
occupy more than one role while speaking. The majority refused to credit
the fact that "[t]he proper answer to the question 'whether the First Amend-
ment protects a government employee from discipline based on speech
made pursuant to the employee's official duties' is 'Sometimes,' not 'Nev-
er.' 99 Nonetheless, Garcetti is the law as it stands today. And so its
detractors are left to address, and perhaps curtail, its ramifications at the
margins. If adopted by the Supreme Court, the civilian analogue exception
might prove a viable avenue for the preservation of public employee speech
rights in some important instances.
II. JACKLER V BYRNE: A CIVILIAN ANALOGUE EXCEPTION TO GARCETTI?
This Part discusses the possibility of a civilian analogue exception to
Garcetti. Though Garcetti referred obliquely to the idea of a public employ-
ee's speech having an analogue to citizen speech in some circumstances, 00
the Second Circuit in Jackler v. Byrne drew upon this language to create a
novel exception to Garcetti's rule.10' The Second Circuit held that if an em-
ployee's speech is sufficiently analogous to speech an ordinary citizen could
make, then the First Amendment claim may proceed despite the fact that the
employee was speaking pursuant to his official duties as well. 0 2
Section II.A briefly reviews Weintraub v. Board of Education, the Sec-
ond Circuit precedent on which the Jackler court relied in articulating the
civilian analogue exception. Section II.B discusses Jackler itself and ex-
plains how the Second Circuit used the presence of a civilian analogue to
the plaintiff's speech as the basis for an exception to Garcetti's blanket
holding. Section II.C concedes, in agreement with the D.C. Circuit, that the
Second Circuit misapplied Garcetti in Jackler: a civilian analogue exception
does not follow from either the language or the logic of that decision.
A. Prologue to Jackler
The Second Circuit first suggested that the presence of a civilian ana-
logue could have independent legal significance in Weintraub v. Board of
693-94 (5th Cir. 2007) (official duty speech is that which is "not necessarily required ... but
nevertheless... related to his job duties").
99. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 424 (stating that speech pursuant to an employee's official duties has "no
relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government employees").
101. 658 F.3d 225, 234-42 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012).
102. Jackler, 658 F.3d at 234-42.
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Education.0 3 The employee in Weintraub was a public school teacher who
filed a complaint with his teachers' union after school officials refused to
discipline a student. °n Although the Second Circuit ultimately concluded
that the teacher spoke pursuant to his official duties because the complaint
was in furtherance of his teaching responsibilities, °5 the court supported its
conclusion by noting that there was "no relevant civilian analogue" for the
employee's speech. 06
The Weintraub court explained that the "civilian analogue" concept had
its origins in Garcetti itself. In articulating the distinction between on-duty
and off-duty speech, the court quoted language from the Garcetti opinion
stating that "[w]hen a public employee speaks pursuant to employment re-
sponsibilities ... there is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are
not government employees."'0 7 The Weintraub court reasoned that because
there is no form of speech a nongovernment employee-citizen could make
that is sufficiently analogous to the teacher's complaint to his teacher's un-
ion-that is, a nonteacher could not submit his own grievance to the
union-the employee was speaking in his role as a teacher when he filed the
complaint. 08
To illustrate the form a relevant civilian analogue to employee speech
could take, the Weintraub court pointed to a Ninth Circuit case, Freitag v.
Ayers. 9 In Freitag, the employee was a prison guard who complained to a
state senator and the state inspector general about her supervisors' failure to
address inmates' inappropriate behavior toward female guards." 0 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that a prison guard's "responsibility as a citizen to expose
such official malfeasance" meant that the guard's complaints to public offi-
cials-complaints that someone who was not a prison guard presumably
could also make-were not made pursuant to her official duties. 1' "[The
guard's] right to complain both to an elected public official and to an inde-
pendent state agency is guaranteed to any citizen in a democratic society
regardless of his status as a public employee," and so the Ninth Circuit held
that her complaints constituted protected speech. 1
2
In contrast to Freitag, the Second Circuit reasoned, the teacher in Wein-
traub "could only speak in the manner that he did by filing a grievance with
his teacher's union as a public employee.""' The opportunity to bring one's
grievance to an elected official or state agency is a channel available to
103. 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010).
104. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 198-99.
105. Id. at 203.
106. Id.
107. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006)).
108. Id. at 204.
109. 468 E3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006).
110. Freitag, 468 F.3d at 535.
111. Id. at 545.
112. Id.
113. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 204 (emphasis added).
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citizens generally, but union grievances are part of a particular dispute reso-
lution process that exists only by virtue of an agreement between a union
and an employer. The latter channel is otherwise foreclosed to the general
citizenry.' 4 Without a relevant analogue to civilian speech, the Weintraub
court held that the teacher's complaint" 'retain[ed no] possibility' of consti-
tutional protection."115 The lack of a civilian analogue was not dispositive in
Weintraub. It merely supported the conclusion the court was already pre-
pared to draw. The decision nevertheless set the stage for Jackler, a case in
which the existence of a civilian analogue did determine the outcome.
B. Jackler v. Byrne
The Jackler court held that the existence of a relevant civilian analogue
for an employee's speech entitled the speech to First Amendment protection,
despite the fact that the employee spoke pursuant to his official duties as
well. The public employee, Jackler, was a police officer who witnessed his
fellow officer use unjustified force against a suspect. 16 Jackler was required
by police department policy to make his own formal report of what he wit-
nessed." 7 After he issued his report, Jackler's department supervisors
instructed him to retract it and write a new one that more closely corroborat-
ed his fellow officer's version of the events. In effect, his supervisors asked
him to retract his true statements and issue false ones in their place.' 
18
Jackler refused to do so and suffered retaliation. 19 In pretrial motions,
Jackler did not argue that the First Amendment protected his filing of the
original truthful report. Instead, he argued that the First Amendment pro-
tected his second "speech": his refusal to speak falsely in a law enforcement
investigation. 120
The Second Circuit held that "Jackler's refusal to comply with orders to
retract his truthful Report and file one that was false ha[d] a clear civilian
analogue" and so "Jackler was not simply doing his job in refusing to obey
those orders from the department's top administrative officers and the chief
of police." 121 The key to the holding was the court's finding that any non-
police officer could make some kind of report to a police department and,
having done so, the police could not constitutionally force the individual to
retract that report and say instead what the police wanted him to say. 122 In
114. Id.
115. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006)).





120. See id. at 232.
121. Id. at241-42.
122. Id. at 241 ("[A] citizen has a First Amendment right to decide what to say and what
not to say, and, accordingly, the right to reject governmental efforts to require him to make
statements he believes are false. Thus, a citizen who has truthfully reported a crime has the
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fact, the court reasoned, if the individual did comply with those orders, he
would be breaking the law by knowingly giving false information in a police
investigation. 123 Jackler and a hypothetical non-police officer were in essen-
tially the same position, since "retracting a truthful statement to law
enforcement officials and substituting one that is false would expose the
speaker-whether he be a police officer or a civilian-to criminal liabil-
ity.' 24 The court thus took one logical step beyond Garcetti and Weintraub:
instead of pointing to the lack of a civilian analogue to the employee's
speech as a reason why the employee could not have been speaking as a
citizen, the Second Circuit used the existence of a civilian analogue to justi-
fy the conclusion that the employee was speaking as a citizen.
At first glance, the Jackler holding may not seem like it goes significant-
ly further than Garcetti. After all, the Garcetti Court endorsed the result in
Pickering, a case in which a teacher was protected partly on the logic that he
wrote a letter to a newspaper just as an ordinary citizen could. 25 The key
difference is that the Jackler court did not hold that Jackler was not speaking
pursuant to his official duties; instead, the existence of a relevant civilian
analogue for Jackler's speech triggered First Amendment protection despite
the fact that he spoke pursuant to his official duties. Had the court faithfully
applied Garcetti, the fact that Jackler had spoken pursuant to his official
responsibilities, even in part, would have foreclosed his First Amendment
claim entirely. But although the Second Circuit acknowledged that Jackler
was speaking as a police officer when he refused to take back his report and
issue a false one in its place-noting that "[o]f course a police officer has a
duty not to substitute a falsehood for the truth, i.e., a duty to tell 'nothing but
the truth' "-it justified the result because "he plainly ha[d] that duty as a
citizen as well."'126 The Second Circuit did not merely apply Garcetti's em-
ployee-versus-citizen rule; it created a significant exception to it.
C. Jackler's Manipulation of Garcetti
Unfortunately, the Second Circuit's civilian analogue exception does not
follow from Garcetti itself. While the Garcetti Court did mention the rele-
vance of a civilian analogue to determining whether an individual was
speaking as an employee or a citizen, a close reading of that discussion does
not indicate that the Court meant to state that whenever an analogue is pre-
sent, the categorical bar does not apply.
The Garcetti majority made only one reference to the idea of civilian
analogue in the opinion. That mention was in the context of explaining the
indisputable right to reject pressure from the police to have him rescind his accusation and
falsely exculpate the accused.").
123. Id. at 239-41.
124. Id. at 240.
125. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423-24 (2006).
126. Jackler, 658 E3d at 241 (emphasis added). The court's concession that Jackler was
also acting pursuant to his official duties is emphasized by the language of the holding: "Jack-
ler was not simply doing his job" but was also acting as a citizen. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
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"theoretical underpinnings" of its prior public employee speech decisions. 27
The Court contrasted the speech of "[e]mployees who make public state-
ments outside the course of performing their official duties" with an
"employee speak[ing] pursuant to employment responsibilities," asserting
that the latter has "no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not
government employees."'' 28 The civilian analogue reasoning thus served as a
justification for the conclusion that a public employee has no First Amend-
ment claim when he is speaking as an employee qua employee and not as a
an employee qua citizen. The reference to a lack of a civilian analogue was
effectively an observation about the state of the world-a statement of fact.
It was not an invitation for lower courts to search for civilian analogues as
an escape hatch from Garcetti.
The Garcetti majority did not indicate that the analogy between the em-
ployees in its previous cases and civilians was the reason why those
employees' speech could be protected. Instead, the analogy was relevant
evidence allowing the Court to find that those plaintiffs were not acting pur-
suant to their official duties when they made the speech. Second Circuit
judge Guido Calabresi's dissent in Weintraub made a similar point, arguing
that Garcetti's discussion of a civilian analogue was not meant "to set out a
doctrinal requirement." The Garcetti Court "was explaining why speech that
is 'pursuant to employment responsibilities' is unprotected, not defining that
category of speech."'' 29 The Jackler court went even beyond the move that
Judge Calabresi criticized in Weintraub. Instead of requiring the presence of
a civilian analogue to find that an employee was not speaking pursuant to
his employment responsibilities, it used the presence of a civilian analogue
to allow the plaintiff to move on to the balancing stage despite his failure to
meet Garcetti's "pursuant to official duties" bar. 3 °
127. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423-24.
128. Id.
129. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir. 2010) (Calabresi, J., dissent-
ing) (citations omitted).
130. It bears mentioning that some courts have interpreted the Jackler decision different-
ly in this respect. A post-Jackler decision from the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, Matthews v. City of New York, No. 12 cv 1354 (BSJ), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53213
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2012), reasoned that the Jackler court merely found that Jackler's refusal to
speak falsely was only "related to his job duties," not pursuant to his job duties, and therefore
Jackler was speaking only as a citizen and not concurrently as an employee. Id. at *I1-12
(emphasis added). Having drawn this distinction, the Matthews court held that Jackler did not
create an exception to Garcetti but merely applied it. See id. at *12-13 ("It is not, as [the
plaintiff] contends, that the presence of a civilian analogue necessarily confers First Amend-
ment protection, but rather the reverse-when a public employee engages in citizen speech, it
is unavoidable that there will be some civilian analogue to his speech."). In addition, another
Second Circuit panel referred to Jackler in the footnote of a summary dismissal and stated that
the decision concluded only "that an officer who refused an order to retract a truthful state-
ment and replace it with a false one acted as a private citizen, rather than as a public
employee." See D'Olimpio v. Crisafi, 462 F. App'x 79, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012). According to
these courts, Jackler only decided that the presence of a civilian analogue is relevant to deter-
mining whether the plaintiff was actually speaking as a citizen and not as an employee. If this
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Unsurprisingly, another circuit severely criticized Jackler's exception
almost immediately. In Bowie v. Maddox, decided about a month after Jack-
ler, the D.C. Circuit confronted a public employee First Amendment case
concerning an official in the D.C. Office of the Inspector General
("OIG").13' The facts were very similar to Jackler. The OIG official claimed
he had been fired for refusing to sign an affidavit-which his employer had
prepared for a subordinate's Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") proceedings and which the official believed contained false in-
formation-and for rewriting the affidavit to reflect his views. 32 Relying on
Jackler, the official argued that even if he was acting pursuant to his em-
ployment responsibilities when he modified the affidavit, his speech should
nonetheless be protected because it was analogous to testimony that private
citizens give to the EEOC. 33
The D.C. Circuit explicitly rejected the Second Circuit's civilian ana-
logue reasoning, stating that the Second Circuit "g[ot] Garcetti
backwards." '134 It noted that Garcetti's reference to a civilian analogue "does
not mean that whenever speech has a civilian analogue it is protected by the
First Amendment" as "It]he Court made clear that only when public em-
ployees 'make public statements outside the course of performing their
official duties' do they 'retain some possibility of First Amendment protec-
tion.' Only then is the analogy to private speech 'relevant.'"135 Garcetti's
"critical question," the D.C. Circuit emphasized, remains whether the
is correct, then the Jackler court went no further than the Second Circuit's decision in Wein-
traub.
But as discussed infra, the D.C. Circuit shares my reading of Jackler's civilian analogue
discussion-i.e., as holding that the presence of a civilian analogue enables the public em-
ployee to bypass Garcetti's bar even if the employee was concurrently speaking pursuant to
official duties. See Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F.3d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir.) (stating, in criticizing Jack-
ler's holding, that Garcetti's reference to a civilian analogue "does not mean that whenever
speech has a civilian analogue it is protected by the First Amendment"), denying reh 'g to 642
F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012). Moreover-as I explain in
this Section and as the D.C. Circuit convincingly established in Bowie-the civilian analogue
exception (as I interpret the Jackler panel's decision to have applied it) contradicts the Su-
preme Court's holding in Garcetti. It is therefore not surprising that lower courts and a later
Second Circuit panel are seeking to distance themselves from the Jackler panel's doctrinal
move by interpreting its discussion of a civilian analogue to stand for a less startling proposi-
tion.
131. 653 E3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Though it had already ruled in the case earlier in the
year, the D.C. Circuit considered Bowie's petition for rehearing in light of the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Jackler. Bowie, 653 E3d at 46-47.
132. Id. at46.
133. Id. at 46-47.
134. Id. at 48; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Byrne v. Jackler, 132 S. Ct.
1634 (2012) (mem.) (No. 11-517), 2011 WL 5059136, at *6 ("The [Bowie] rehearing opinion
explained not only why Garcetti controlled the result, but also why the Second Circuit's entire
approach in Jackler is unfaithful to Garcetti and unsound legally. In analyzing the Second
Circuit Jackler opinion, the D.C. Circuit did not use tweezers; it used a sledgehammer.").
135. Bowie, 653 F.3d at 47 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423-24 (2006)).
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employee was speaking pursuant to official duties, not whether the speech
has a civilian analogue.
36
Though it held the Jackler petition for a month in order to consider it in
conference alongside Bowie,' 37 the Supreme Court declined to grant certio-
rari in either case.' 38 The Court's unwillingness to resolve the burgeoning
circuit split was surprising to members of the legal community. 13 9 Whatever
its reasons for declining to confront the issue then, the Court should eventu-
ally consider the merits of the civilian analogue exception and-as this Note
argues in Part III-adopt it.
III. THE MERITS OF THE CIVILIAN ANALOGUE EXCEPTION
The fact that the plaintiff in Jackler was simultaneously acting as a po-
lice officer worried about fulfilling his departmental duties and as a citizen
worried about his liability for perjury does not sustain his First Amendment
claim in a post-Garcetti world. Garcetti makes clear that the rules are differ-
ent for public employees if they are acting in their employment capacity,
whether in whole or in part.'
14
Therefore, as the law stands today, Jackler was wrongly decided. Gar-
cetti's pursuant-to-official-duties rule protects public employee speech only
when it can be shown that the employee was speaking solely as a citizen. As
argued above, this rule is misguided because it gives an unjustified amount
of deference to the government employer's managerial prerogative at the
136. Id. at 48.
137. John Elwood, Relist (and Hold) Watch, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 19, 2012, 10:29 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/relist-and-hold-watch-I0/ (noting that, at the conclusion
of certiorari-stage briefing in Jackler, the Court appeared to be holding the petition in order to
consider it with the Bowie petition).
138. Bowie v. Maddox, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 642 E3d 1122
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Byrne v. Jackler, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 658 F3d
225 (2d Cir. 2011).
139. See Robyn Hagan Cain, Supreme Court Rejects David Bowie, FINDLAW (Feb. 28,
2012, 8:42 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/supreme-Court/2012/02/supreme-court-rejects-
david-bowie.html (expressing surprise at the Court's refusal to resolve the circuit split
"particularly after the D.C. Circuit specifically called out the Second Circuit for misinterpret-
ing Garcetti"); see also Tom Goldstein, Post to Live Blog of Orders: February 27, 2012,
SCOTUSBLO6 (Feb. 27, 2012, 9:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.conV2012/02/live-blog-of-
orders-february-27-2012-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law/ (predicting, before the certiorari
denials, that Bowie and Jackler would be "the mostly likely grants for today"); cf Lyle
Denniston, Free Speech Issue Bypassed, SCOTUSBLoG (Feb. 27, 2012, 12:23 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/free-speech-issue-bypassed/ ("The Justices' refusal to step into
that controversy [posed by the Bowie-Jackler split] leaves it to be worked out further among
the lower courts, meaning that public employees will have different legal rights depending
upon where they live and work.").
140. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006); cf id. at 427 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (criticizing the majority because "[tihe notion that there is a categorical difference
between speaking as a citizen and speaking in the course of one's employment is quite
wrong").
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expense of the public, which ultimately loses when it is denied access to a
valuable source of information on matters of public concern.' 
4
The problem of Garcetti's ill-chosen lines remains. But assuming that
the decision endures for some time to come, it is still possible to limit its
reach. If adopted, the Second Circuit's civilian analogue exception could
partially address the policies given short shrift by Garcetti's failure to rec-
ognize the public employee's dual roles. For this reason, this Part argues that
the Supreme Court should adopt the Second Circuit's civilian analogue ex-
ception to Garcetti's categorical bar.
Section II.A suggests that allowing certain cases to proceed to the Pick-
ering balancing stage when it can be shown that the employee spoke as both
an employee and a citizen will further substantive First Amendment goals at
no real expense to the Garcetti majority's concerns. This is because the ci-
vilian analogue exception recognizes the importance of such speech to the
public debate, gives due deference to managerial prerogative, and promotes
candor in judicial factfinding. Section III.B then anticipates skepticism re-
garding the theory behind the civilian analogue and responds briefly to these
concerns.
A. A First Amendment Policy Argument for the Exception
Garcetti assumes one can speak either as an employee or an off-duty
citizen, but never as both. But the Court has acknowledged on previous
occasions that a public employee can simultaneously occupy more than one
role when she speaks. 42 For instance, in City of Madison Joint School Dis-
trict No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the Court noted
that a teacher speaking at a public school board meeting on pending collec-
tive bargaining negotiations "addressed the school board not merely as one
of its employees but also as a concerned citizen."'' 43 The Madison Joint
School District Court even relied on civilian analogue reasoning to reach its
holding: "It is conceded that any citizen could have presented precisely the
same points and provided the board with the same information as did [the
teacher during the public meeting]."'" It is disingenuous to describe that
situation as one in which the plaintiff spoke only as a citizen and not as an
employee in furtherance of his duties, though that is what Garcetti requires
for the case's pro-plaintiff outcome. A civilian analogue exception, however,
would not require a court to massage the facts surrounding a public employ-
ee's speech in order to reach an outcome that furthers First Amendment
policy. Even if an employee's motives for speaking overlap with the duties
her job requires of her-that is, even if the employee "retains her citizen's
141. See supra Section I.C.
142. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 429-30 (Souter, J., dissenting).
143. 429 U.S. 167, 174-75 (1976).
144. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 175.
March 2013]
Michigan Law Review
conscience while at work"' 4 5-a court could still proceed to determine
whether the employee spoke on a matter of public interest sufficient to out-
weigh the employer's interest.
A civilian analogue exception to Garcetti preserves the value to the pub-
lic of hearing the public employee's speech. As discussed in Section L.A, the
First Amendment is not only concerned with protecting the speaker's inter-
est in speaking freely. 146 The safeguard rests on "something more, being the
value to the public of receiving the opinions and information that a public
employee may disclose." 47 As "It]he inherent worth of the speech in terms
of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of
its source,' 1 48 if public employees are unduly silenced-as Garcetti's bar
currently requires-"the community ... [is] deprived of informed opinions
on important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the public's in-
terest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to
disseminate it."'' 49
A civilian analogue exception does not completely fix the audience
problem wrought by Garcetti. The decision will still bar the majority of
public employee claims, and the public will continue to lose an important
source of information and opinion.5 0 But allowing even a few cases current-
ly barred by the official-duties rule to reach the Pickering balancing stage is
worthwhile. Moreover, the kinds of cases that meet the exception are ones in
which the value of the speech to the public discourse is likely to be high. If
public employee speech has a civilian analogue, then the employee's speech
is likely to relate to a matter of public concern rather than a purely intraof-
fice affair or grievance.' 51 This exception is therefore more likely to capture
cases the First Amendment should ultimately be concerned with, rather than
cases that potentially "constitutionalize the employee grievance."' 52 That is,
145. Jessica Reed, Note, From Pickering to Ceballos: The Demise of the Public Employ-
ee Free Speech Doctrine, 1I N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 123 (2007).
146. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) ("The Constitution
often protects interests broader than those of the party seeking their vindication.").
147. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 429 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 766
(asserting that speech concerning matters of public importance is at "the heart" of the First
Amendment).
148. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777.
149. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
150. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 433 (Souter, J., dissenting); Chemerinsky, supra note 90, at
340 ("[The Garcetti] opinion thus signals ... a restriction on the ability of the public to learn
of government misconduct.").
151. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 237 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding police misconduct
to be "plainly" a matter public concern), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012); Freitag v. Ayers,
468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding the plaintiff's assertions that prison supervisors
looked the other way when inmates sexually harassed female prison guards to be "relevan[t] to
the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies" (alteration in original)
(quoting Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
152. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).
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the exception is not likely to let back in the meritless cases that most wor-
ried the Garcetti majority.1
53
As for deference to managerial prerogative,'54 the civilian analogue ex-
ception does not diminish the government employer's ability to control its
official message.'55 Although the Garcetti decision represented the Court's
acknowledgment that government supervisors "must ensure that their em-
ployees' official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment,
and promote the employer's mission,'' 56 this substantive goal is not readily
accomplished by suppressing the speech of employees who speak in a man-
ner akin to a nongovernment employee.
A few concrete examples help establish this point. On one end of the
spectrum, there is the government spokesperson. The government has an
obvious and compelling interest in controlling that employee's speech, as
the employee has identified, and the public readily understands the govern-
ment to be the source of the message.'57 Speech by a spokesperson,
however, is not likely to have any relevant analogue to civilian speech-the
nonspokesperson will not readily find herself in a position to speak in the
same manner and to the same audience.'58 On the other end of the spectrum,
there is the Pickering-esque public employee who writes a letter to a local
newspaper'5 9 or contacts an outside elected official 60 expressing her concern
about a certain government practice. There, the government might prefer
that the employee not speak in this manner. But there is no significant dan-
ger that the public will understand the employee to be speaking as an
authorized representative of the government, delivering its message, at the
153. See id. at 423 (characterizing a ruling in favor of the public employee as a "dis-
placement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision").
154. For a discussion of the managerial prerogative theory that animated the Garcetti
decision, see supra Section I.B.
155. Cf Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422-23 (describing government supervisors' need to de-
liver the government's message to the public with "consistency and clarity").
156. Id.
157. See Norton, supra note 69, at 27-28, 30. Helen Norton argues that the First
Amendment only allows the government to control the speech of employees who the govern-
ment "has specifically hired to deliver a particular viewpoint that is transparently
governmental in origin and thus open to meaningful credibility and accountability checks by
the public." Id. at 31-34.
158. See, e.g., Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010). In Foley, the plain-
tiff fire chief was fired after he publicly criticized the department's lack of funding and staffing
during a press conference. The court stressed the importance of context in deciding that he
was speaking pursuant to his role as a fire department employee. The fire chief spoke about
matters pertaining entirely to the fire department while in uniform, on duty, at the scene of a
recent fire, and immediately before the comments of another fire department official. The
combination of these contextual factors gave the appearance, to the public, that his comments
conveyed the department's message, and therefore his comments were not akin to any sort of
citizen speech. Id. at 8-9.
159. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565-67, 573-74 (1968).
160. See Freitag v. Ayers, 468 E3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006).
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time that she speaks. 161 A public employee that speaks pursuant to both her
role as an employee and a citizen is likely to fall somewhere in between
these two poles. But again, the circumstance that renders her manner of
speech analogous to citizen speech is likely to make her more like the letter
writer than the acknowledged representative. These kinds of cases will not
significantly undercut the government's control of its message.
Finally, grafting a civilian analogue exception onto Garcetti's blanket
exclusion promotes honesty in lower court factfinding. Faced with a choice
between finding that an employee spoke in part pursuant to a professional
obligation-consequently barring her claim-or finding that the employee
spoke entirely pursuant to motivations shared by ordinary citizens-which
would allow her claim to proceed-lower courts ruling on sympathetic cases
have often opted for the latter route. 6 2 This is partially due to the Supreme
Court's reluctance to define what exactly it means for an employee to speak
"pursuant to official duties."' 63 Nonetheless, there is an incentive for lower
courts to oversimplify in determining which role a public employee occu-
pied when she spoke. 164 The freedom to acknowledge that a given plaintiff
might have spoken pursuant to mixed motivations, including her profession-
al obligations and responsibilities, will allow a court to more candidly assess
the nature of the employee's speech and determine if its protection really
serves First Amendment values.
B. A Defense of the Exception
If adopted by the Supreme Court, the civilian analogue exception would
mitigate Garcetti's harm to public employee speech law. It should be
acknowledged, however, that the concept is underdeveloped as a legal theo-
ry, and its shortcomings are already apparent. Though a complete
development and defense of the exception is beyond the scope of this Note,
some anticipated criticisms warrant a brief response.
161. Compare Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (examining, as a
factor in the official-duties analysis, "whether the speech gave objective observers the impres-
sion that the employee represented the employer when she spoke (lending it 'official
significance')"), with Bearss v. Wilton, 445 F. App'x 400, 402-04 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding
plaintiff city information technology coordinator spoke as a representative of the city when
she gave a statement to a reporter regarding city information technology policy, as her state-
ment took on the character of an official communication).
162. See, e.g., Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1332 (10th Cir.
2007) (finding that a school superintendent was acting as a citizen when she complained to the
state attorney general that the school board was making personnel decisions in violation of the
state's open meetings law).
163. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87, 91-98.
164. Cf Christine Elzer, Note, The "Official Duties" Puzzle: Lower Courts' Struggle
with First Amendment Protection for Public Employees After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U. PITT.
L. REv. 367, 388 (2007) (calling for lower courts to make these findings "in light of public
policy concerns" and to "be especially sensitive to the 'matter of public concern' of exposing
governmental wrongdoing and ... not be too quick to conclude that the public employee did
not speak 'as a citizen' in disclosing that wrongdoing").
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First, a legal rule that allows a public employee to bring a First Amend-
ment claim if her on-duty speech has a civilian analogue invites an obvious
follow-up question: What kind of civilian speech is sufficiently analogous?
Or, put differently, how loosely may the analogy be drawn? For, as the D.C.
Circuit pointed out in Bowie, "[a]ll official speech, viewed at a sufficient
level of abstraction, has a civilian analogue.
165
The Second Circuit did not endeavor to comprehensively answer this
question in Jackler, nor in Weintraub. However, the law is well practiced in
drawing principled lines that distinguish one thing from another.166 The Sec-
ond Circuit's standard, though not fully developed at this early stage, hardly
calls for extraordinary analysis. Moreover, existing cases outline what does,
and does not, constitute a sufficient analogue. A prison guard's expression of
concern about sexual harassment to elected public officials is considered
analogous to speech any citizen could make, 167 but a teacher's act of submit-
ting a grievance to her union, in accordance with established workplace
procedures, is not. 68 A non-prison guard could take the same concern to
elected public officials; a nonteacher could not take a similar complaint to a
teacher's union. The mode and manner of speaking are thus crucial to a de-
termination of whether an analogue exists. 169
The factual scenario presented in Jackler is instructive. The police of-
ficer, Jackler, did not claim-nor did the Second Circuit find-that there
was a civilian analogue for his drafting of the original report detailing the
incident in which he witnessed his partner use unnecessary force on a sus-
pect. 7° This makes sense: upon the suspect's filing of a civilian complaint
against Jackler's partner, Jackler was required-by police department
policy-to file the supplementary report detailing what he witnessed.'
165. Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir.), denying reh'g to 642 E3d 1122
(D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012).
166. The Court's expressive conduct jurisprudence is a case in point. Compare Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1968) (the act of burning an American flag is expressive
conduct), and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969)
(the act of wearing a black armband is analogous to "pure speech"), with City of Dali. v. Stan-
glin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (the act of recreational dancing with a minor is neither analogous
to expressive association nor to speech). The Stanglin Court's reasoning is illustrative: "It is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes-for
example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall-but such a
kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the First Amendment." 490
U.S. at 25.
167. Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 545 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[The guard's] right to com-
plain both to an elected public official and to an independent state agency is guaranteed to any
citizen in a democratic society regardless of his status as a public employee.").
168. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 2010).
169. See id. (finding that in contrast to the guard in Freitag, the teacher in this case
"could only speak in the manner that he did by filing a grievance with his teacher's union as a
public employee" (emphasis added)).





Jackler was so required because he was a police officer present at the scene
of the alleged incident. No non-police officer could have filed the report he
filed. And Jackler's motivation stemmed only from his department's policy
and his supervisor's demands. Therefore, his mode of speaking had no ana-
logue in civilian speech. By this same logic, the speech of the Garcetti
plaintiff, the deputy district attorney, had no civilian analogue. There is no
act that an ordinary citizen could undertake that parallels in any significant
respect a prosecutor's preparation of a case disposition memo.1
7 2
But once Jackler issued his report and his supervisors told him to change
the facts to more closely align with his partner's version of the events, Jack-
ler's refusal to speak falsely did have a civilian analogue.'73 Just as an
ordinary citizen would have a First Amendment right to resist government
pressure to lie in a police investigation, Jackler had the right to resist his
supervisors' pressure to do the same. 74 He found himself in a position anal-
ogous to that faced by a non-police officer: either lie as the government told
him to and face possible criminal charges, or refuse."' The only meaningful
difference between Jackler and a hypothetical civilian is that because Jackler
happened to work for the government entity that sought to control his
speech, he lost his job as a result of his refusal. 176 This is precisely why First
Amendment protections for public employees exist-to "ensure that citizens
are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the govern-
ment."1
77
Other scenarios presenting public employee speech with a sufficient ci-
vilian analogue can be gleaned from case law. For example, in Shewbridge
v. El Dorado Irrigation District, 78 a plaintiff water engineer was fired from
his position with the local irrigation district after he reported safety concerns
to outside state agencies and the public. 79 The engineer claimed his termi-
nation violated the First Amendment. As usual, the dispute at summary
judgment centered on whether he was speaking pursuant to his official du-
ties at the time he voiced his concerns.18° The defendant irrigation district
172. Cf Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (referring to "the fact that [the
plaintiff] spoke as a prosecutor fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how
best to proceed with a pending case").
173. Jackler, 658 E3d at 241-42.
174. Id. at 241 ("[A] citizen has a First Amendment right to decide what to say and what
not to say, and, accordingly, the right to reject governmental efforts to require him to make
statements he believes are false. Thus, a citizen who has truthfully reported a crime has the
indisputable right to reject pressure from the police to have him rescind his accusation and
falsely exculpate the accused.").
175. See id. at 240.
176. Id. at 232.
177. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); see also Borough of Duryea v. Guar-
nieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2493 (2011) ("There are some rights and freedoms so fundamental to
liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a contract for public employment.").
178. No. CIV. S-05-0740 FCD EFB, 2006 WL 3741878 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2006).
179. Shewbridge, 2006 WL 3741878, at *1-4.
180. Id. at *5-7.
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argued that the plaintiff had an obligation as an employee working for the
irrigation district to report safety concerns, and so he must have been oper-
ating under those responsibilities when he reported the potential
violations.' 81 The plaintiff argued, conversely, that it was his ethical duty as
an engineer-that is, as a member of a specialized, self-regulating profes-
sion-that led him to report the potential dangers he saw.
182
There is merit to both the employee's contention that he was acting pur-
suant to an independent duty arising out of his professional status, and also
to the water district's rejoinder that his duties as an engineer were insepara-
ble from his duties as an employee of the irrigation district.183 But here the
civilian analogue exception could direct the outcome. Instead of deciding
which of the dual obligations the plaintiff was acting under at the time he
spoke, one could persuasively argue that the engineer was acting pursuant to
both. And because his speech as an engineer for the irrigation district was
sufficiently analogous to speech made by other professional engineers-
regardless of who employed them-the civilian analogue exception could
protect his speech.
Overall, in evaluating a given speech act to determine if a civilian ana-
logue exists, a court can be fairly literal in comparing the speech's manner,
motivation, forum, and audience to its hypothetical civilian counterpart. The
exception will be a narrow one.
Another anticipated critique of the exception is that it will frustrate the
Garcetti majority's desire to avoid highly fact-based litigation in this area of
the law.'84 The Court stated that scrutiny of the relative interests involved
whenever a public employee speaks pursuant to his official duties would
"demand permanent judicial intervention in the conduct of governmental
operations to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and
the separation of powers." '85 If nothing else, the formalist rule limits the
extent to which a court can second-guess the government's employment
decisions at a cost to efficient public services.8 6 A civilian analogue excep-
tion to this rule, the criticism follows, would undercut its benefits. Or, in the
more colorful terms of the D.C. Circuit, "A test that allows a First Amend-
ment retaliation claim to proceed whenever the government employee can
181. Id. at *6.
182. Id.
183. The district court apparently agreed that the plaintiff's argument, at least, had merit,
finding that there was a sufficient issue of fact for the claim to survive summary judgment. Id.
at *7.
184. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 435-36 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 423 (majority opinion).
186. See Rhodes, supra note 45, at 1192 (acknowledging that formalist rules are prefera-
ble when the prediction of future outcomes is critical and when such rules will constrain the
judiciary's discretion in beneficial ways); Bice, supra note 96, at 66 (describing Garcetti as a
"test[] designed to block disfavored types of cases").
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identify a civilian analogue for his speech is about as useful as a mosquito
net made of chicken wire."'
8 7
The first response to this line of argument is that the civilian analogue
exception is hardly chicken wire. On the contrary, the exception is likely to
apply only in rare instances. 81 It is probable, especially once more case law
develops indicating just how narrowly the exception will be drawn, that
Garcetti's categorical bar will be left largely intact (for better or for worse).
But more importantly, it can be argued that as a result of Garcetti's largely
undefined standard for what constitutes speech "pursuant to official duties,"
the Supreme Court's attempt at formalism has not proven successful in re-
ducing fact-based litigation in the first instance. 189 Courts have often proven
unwilling to dismiss post-Garcetti claims at the pretrial stage, or even at the
summary judgment stage, finding that issues of fact regarding the employ-
ee's official duties remain. 190 Commentators have documented the divergent
approaches lower courts have taken to the "official duties" test,9t : some
courts focus on whether the speech was directed up the typical workplace
chain of command, 92 some focus on whether the speech falls within the
assigned responsibilities associated with the employee's position, 193 and
others narrow the category of speech to only that which is required of the
employee. 94 The bottom line is that the Court's rule has not succeeded in
187. Bowie v. Maddox, 653 F3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir.), denying reh'g to 642 F3d 1122
(D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012).
188. The Second Circuit's docket since Jackler supports this prediction. See Massaro v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., No. 11-2721-CV, 2012 WL 1948772, at *2 (2d Cir. May 31, 2012)
(finding that teacher spoke as an employee when she complained to school administrators
about potential sanitation issues in her classroom); D'Olimpio v. Crisafi, 462 E App'x 79, 80-
81 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that a state employee spoke in furtherance of his duties when state
law required him to report official misconduct to the inspector general); Bearss v. Wilton, 445
E App'x 400, 404 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that a city information technology employee spoke
pursuant to her official duties when she gave a statement about information technology de-
partment policy to a reporter and testified in a Board of Civil Authority hearing); Otte v.
Brusinski, 440 E App'x 5, 6 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that a treatment assistant at a secured
hospital spoke pursuant to his official duties when he raised a concern about patients' use of a
microwave, as the concern was "part-and-parcel" of his duty to maintain a safe environment
for patients and hospital staff).
189. See, e.g., Norcross, supra note 67, at 556-58 ("[T]he lower courts' applications of
Garcetti are inconsistent because the Court's 'practical inquiry' instruction left open and un-
clear how to specifically define 'pursuant to official duties.' "). Justice Souter predicted as
much in his dissenting opinion, arguing that "the majority's position comes with no guarantee
against factbound litigation over whether a public employee's statements were made 'pursuant
to ... official duties.' In fact, the majority invites such litigation by describing the enquiry as a
'practical one' apparently based on the totality of employment circumstances." Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
190. Dale, supra note 70, at 197-98; Bice, supra note 96, at 46, 73-77.
191. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 70, at 196-204; Rhodes, supra note 45, at 1195-96;
Elzer, supra note 164, at 375-86; Wiese, supra note 96, at 515-23.
192. Wiese, supra note 96, at 516-19.
193. See id. at 519-22.
194. See id. at 1195 n. 177 (citing cases).
[Vol. 111:759
Policeman, Citizen, or Both?
ensuring predictability in public employee speech cases; instead, "the Court
has merely shifted the uncertainty to the scope of the underlying categoriza-
tion."'195 If one accepts this to be the case, the value of Garcetti in reducing
factbound litigation is diminished. Therefore, the further damage caused by
opening up another avenue to avoiding the categorical bar is arguably not
great, especially when considered in proportion to the value such an excep-
tion could have in realizing significant First Amendment policy goals.
CONCLUSION
"[W]hen constitutionally significant interests clash, resist the demand
for winner-take-all; try to make adjustments that serve all of the values at
stake."' 96 Garcetti's categorical bar is an unjustified government-take-all
strategy, but the Second Circuit's civilian analogue exception could prove to
be the adjustment-or compromise-that preserves First Amendment pro-
tections for public employees for the right reasons. If the ultimate goal of
Pickering, Connick, and even Garcetti is to protect the speech rights of pub-
lic employees to the same extent as the rights of any member of the general
public, a legal rule that protects what is in essence citizen speech, even
when the employee is concurrently speaking pursuant to his professional
obligations, best achieves this result.
195. Id. at 1193; see also Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Nav-
igating the shoals of the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos has
proven to be a tricky business .... (citation omitted)).
196. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 434 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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